The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures.
Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the state debt, may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the United States? For all laws made, in pursuance of this constitution, are the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an individual state, further than they are less responsible to the people.
But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontrollable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government.
And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way.
Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all.
It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation.
Let us now proceed to inquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people.
The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected. History furnishes no example of a free republic, anything like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.
Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law.
In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion concerning it.
In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind. In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed.
This is the true criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the whole, expressed in any manner they may agree upon; the latter by the will of one, or a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the choice and the number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and consequently qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know, or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few.
Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government.
The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number.
Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business?
It certainly is not. In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good.
If we apply this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government.
The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident.
The laws and customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other.
The laws cannot be executed in a republic, of an extent equal to that of the United States, with promptitude. The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of the laws, either by an armed force, maintained at the public expense for that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his command, in case of resistance.
In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, standing armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince or the magistrate, and are employed for this purpose when occasion requires: But they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and [are] abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic. In England, where they depend upon the parliament for their annual support, they have always been complained of as oppressive and unconstitutional, and are seldom employed in executing of the laws; never except on extraordinary occasions, and then under the direction of a civil magistrate.
A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must depend upon the support of its citizens. But when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it must be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection of the people. Men who, upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are influenced to do it either by affection to the government, or from fear; where a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will obey: but, where this is not the case, the government must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their government and laws.
The body of the people being attached, the government will always be sufficient to support and execute its laws, and to operate upon the fears of any faction which may be opposed to it, not only to prevent an opposition to the execution of the laws themselves, but also to compel the most of them to aid the magistrate; but the people will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United States, as necessary for these purposes.
The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave: but in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them.
The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures were founded. The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not support the laws they pass. Hence the government will be nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet — a government of all others the most to be dreaded.
In a republic of such vast extent as the United-States, the legislature cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts.
It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this nature, that would be continually arising.
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United-States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be lodged and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few.
When these are attended with great honor and emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interest men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them.
They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power. These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states.
If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted. Though I am of opinion, that it is a sufficient objection to this government, to reject it, that it creates the whole union into one government, under the form of a republic, yet if this objection was obviated, there are exceptions to it, which are so material and fundamental, that they ought to determine every man, who is a friend to the liberty and happiness of mankind, not to adopt it.
I beg the candid and dispassionate attention of my countrymen while I state these objections — they are such as have obtruded themselves upon my mind upon a careful attention to the matter, and such as I sincerely believe are well founded. There are many objections, of small moment, of which I shall take no notice — perfection is not to be expected in any thing that is the production of man — and if I did not in my conscience believe that this scheme was defective in the fundamental principles — in the foundation upon which a free and equal government must rest — I would hold my peace.
The Founding. Chapter 6: Revolutionary Considerations of Citizen To Lord Howe. Speech in Congress on Confederation. Letter to John Jay. Notes on the State of Virginia: Religion. New Hampshire Bill of Rights.
Letter to Thomas Johnson. Letter to the President of Congress. Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. Virginia General Assembly Commission for Delegates Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry. Letter to Thomas Jefferson. Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederati Letter to James Madison. Annapolis Convention Resolution. A Defense of the Constitution of Government of the Letter from Certain Citizens of Rhode Island to th Letter to Edmund Pendleton. To William Short. To James Monroe.
Letter from James M. Varnum, of Rhode Island, to t To Madison's Father. To Thomas Jefferson. To James Madison. Constitution of the United States. A Democratic Federalist, October 17, Foreigner I. A Countryman I. A Landholder III. Letter to John Langdon. Landholder VI. Samuel Adams and the Constitution. A Landholder IX. Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of Advertisement for the Pamphlet Edition of The Fede Elbridge Gerry: Defense of Conduct in Constitution Speeches in the Connecticut Convention.
Resolutions of the Tradesmen of Boston. Massachusetts Centinel. A Landholder X. Reply to Maryland Landholder X.
Fabius I. Fabius II. Reasons for Dissent. Fabius IV. Fabius V. A Farmer. Fabius VI. Speech at Virginia Ratifying Convention. Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June The Ninth Pillar. Oration on the Fourth of July Letter to Alexander Hamilton.
Report of the House Select Committee. Public Opinion. House Debate on the Establishment of Post Roads. British Government. Pacificus No. Letter to Philip Mazzei. Witherspoon Letter about Isaac Newton. Bill of Rights. Objections at the Constitutional Convention. James Wilson's State House Speech. The Federal Farmer IV. A Federalist Essay. John DeWitt II. Brutus II. Atticus III. A Countryman II. Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention.
The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of P Letter to James Madison with Objections to the Pro Letter to Alexander Donald. New Hampshire Ratification Convention: Virginia Ratifying Convention Amendment Proposals. New York Ratifies with 31 proposed amendment New York Ratifying Convention July 26, Letter to James Madison about Improving the Consti Letter to Thomas Jefferson about the Bill of Right And why are we surprised when the rancor and vitriol in politics gets worse and worse all the time?
I doubt Brutus would be surprised. Brutus concludes with a discussion of all the reasons that it is impossible to keep officers honest in a big, national government. They abuse their power and soon lose the trust and respect of the citizens. Maybe he saw that one coming, too.
First Ladies U. History U. Fabius VI. Speech at Virginia Ratifying Convention. Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.
First Speech of June The Ninth Pillar. Oration on the Fourth of July Letter to Alexander Hamilton. Report of the House Select Committee.
Public Opinion. House Debate on the Establishment of Post Roads. British Government. Pacificus No. Letter to Philip Mazzei. Witherspoon Letter about Isaac Newton. Bill of Rights. Objections at the Constitutional Convention. James Wilson's State House Speech. The Federal Farmer IV. A Federalist Essay. John DeWitt II. Brutus II.
Atticus III. A Countryman II. Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention. The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of P Letter to James Madison with Objections to the Pro Letter to Alexander Donald. New Hampshire Ratification Convention: Virginia Ratifying Convention Amendment Proposals. New York Ratifies with 31 proposed amendment New York Ratifying Convention July 26, Letter to James Madison about Improving the Consti Letter to Thomas Jefferson about the Bill of Right Amendments to the Constitution of the United State Federalist No.
Chapter 7: The Debate over Ratification. A Citizen of Philadelphia. Address to the People of the United States. Letter to Henry Knox. Letter to David Shepard. A Foreign Spectator X. A Foreign Spectator XV. A Foreign Spectator XX. Letter to Patrick Henry. Roger Sherman to Governor Samuel Huntington, trans Caesar, Letter I. Centinel I. Federal Farmer II. Federal Farmer III. Federal Farmer V. Convention Essay. One of the Four Thousand. Caesar, Letter II. Brutus I. Atticus II.
Calling Massachusetts State Convention. John DeWitt I. Monitor Essay. Cato III. The Georgia State Convention. Philo-Publius I. Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, October Virginia Calls for State Convention.
A Landholder I. Pennsylvania elects 69 delegates. Centinel III. Letter to Bushrod Washington. Delaware calls for state convention.
A Landholder II. Connecticut Elects delegates for State Convent Brutus III. Essay by A Georgian. Philo-Publius II. The Landholder III. Cato V. Agrippa I. Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, November A Landholder IV. A Democratic Federalist, November 26, Agrippa II. A Pennsylvania Farmer.
New Jersey Elects 38 Delegates. Brutus IV. Philo-Publius III. Letter to David Stuart. Agrippa III. Centinel IV. Philo-Publius IV. Agrippa IV. A Landholder V. Georgia Elects 26 Delegates. Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, December 4, Delaware Ratifies Delaware Ratifying Convention Meets. Agrippa V. Pennsylvania ratifies Cato VI. Brutus V. Letter to Charles Carter. A Landholder VII. Agrippa VII. The New Jersey Form of Ratification: New Jersey Convention. The Jefferson-Madison Exchange.
Atticus IV. Agrippa VIII. Federal Farmer VI. Centinel VII. Centinel VIII. Dates of Ratification of the Constitution. The Problem of Judicial Review. John DeWitt IV. Federal Farmer VII. America Essay. Agrippa X. Cato VII. Brutus VII. Connecticut ratifying convention. Federal Farmer IX. Letter to Governor Edmund Randolph.
Federal Farmer X. Agrippa XI. The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: Common Sense, January 11, Federal Farmer XI. Federal Farmer XII. Speech to the Massachusetts Convention. The State Soldier Essay I. Brutus IX. Federal Farmer XIV.
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